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A folk theorem in environmental economics suggests that in the presence
of transboundary environmental spillovers international negotiations may
improve on environmental quality. More so, if side-payments according to
the "victim-pays principle" are undertaken, environmental safeguards
agreed upon by the parties to an international agreement can be optimal
from the point of view of a global social planner.
Implicitly, this folk theorem makes an important assumption: All
requirements emanating from the stipulations of an international
environmental agreement are smoothly and completely executed within the
home countries of the parties to the contract, or so the story goes.
However, this presumption is not necessarily fulfilled. In particular,
the execution of what the agreement requires from the parties involved
may be severely thwarted by either of three reasons.
First, international environmental agreements are not strictly
enforceable in the legal sense. Country sovereignty may entice a country
to breach in the interest of its constituency an agreement it is already
a party to (Mohr [1990a]). Second, even if international agreements are
binding or supported by the domestic constituency, costs of monitoring
the long way up from government legislation down to agency performance
may lead to substantial implementation gaps (Pethig [1990]). Third, even
if a government is eager to abide by an agreement, it may not be able to
because it does not possess exclusive property rights over the environ-
ment on the home turf. It is this third obstacle to the rosy prospects of
the folk theorem which will be addressed in this paper.
Empirically, this obstacle is, perhaps, of substantial relevance. At
home the arm of the government may simply be too short to enforce the
agreement domestically. A point in this case may be the demise of the
tropical rainforests. Preventing private wildcatting and unauthorised
For an analysis of economic problems associated with deforestation in
the tropic see e.g. Amelung [1990] and Rauscher [1990].development, even if intended, may indeed be a problem for the govern-
ments of countries hosting the rainforests.
However, this paper analyses the implications of a different source
of non-exclusive domestic property rights. The legal system in consti-
tutional democracies may in itself give rise to a non-exclusivity of
domestic property rights over the environment.
Existing emission sources are to some degree protected from a
tightening of standards by project permits given in the past. Even if
these permits have been conditioned on future environmental policy, even
if they are subject to periodic revisions by a bureaucracy or if they are
granted only for a fixed period of time, project operators almost always
have the right to fight a tightening of required environmental safeguards
in the courts. Hence if courts are independent and if the probability of
winning a court litigation is positive for the project operator the do-
mestic government and its agencies do not possess exclusive property
rights over the environment. It is this implication of the trichotony of
powers which will be introduced into the analysis of international envi-
ronmental negotiations.
Interesting questions arise if governments with non-exclusive
domestic titles to the environment are involved in international environ-
mental negotiations. Can an agreement be found at all if the fur under
negotiation is not the sole property of those trying to divide it? If yes,
what are its properties compared to the case of complete domestic con-
trol? Will the folk theorem persist or perish?
With uncertain court litigation pending at home the environmental
implications of an international agreement are ultimately determined at
home. The environmental effects of international agreements therefore
depend on how the "commons" is divided by those which share a title to
it. In this paper the view is entertained that uncertain court litigation
gives an incentive for both project operators and an environmental
bureaucracy to settle the conflict out of court (Mohr [1990b]). This may
be achieved by reaching an agreement on (additional) safeguards to be
applied by the operators. In what follows it is therefore presumed that
the ultimate environmental allocation is determined in a domestic bar-
gaining game.
Questions raised above are addressed by applying the strategic
bargaining approach to negotiations (Rubinstein [1982]). Analysinginternational negotiations in the face of non-exclusive property rights
requires, however, considerations which go beyond those dictated by
bargaining theory alone. If the implications of a negotiated agreement are
ultimately determined outside but under influence of a party inside the
bargaining room, the other parties to an agreement face an agency prob5
lem too. They have to try to push for an agreement which creates an
incentive for that party to act outside the bargaining room in the in-
terest of the other signatants of the agreement.
For illustration, in the precise context of our problem foreign go-
vernments face the task of designing an international agreement which
has the property that the home government, possessing non-exclusive
property rights in the domestic game, acts during negotiations with
project operators in the interest of foreign countries. Given non-ex-
clusive domestic property rights international environmental agreements
should therefore be incentive compatible. It is therefore necessary to
analyse international environmental agreements under considerations of
both bargaining as well as principal-agency theoretic considerations.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the environmental
problem is defined. In section 3 a simple strategic bargaining model is
developed. As a frame of reference international negotiations in the
presence of exclusive property rights are discussed in Section 4. Sec-
tions 5, 6 and 7 then address the consequences of non-exclusivity of
environmental property rights. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. A Simple Upstream - Downstream Model of Transfrontier Pollution
Consider a two country model where in the home country a project is
undertaken with gross value per period W. The project causes environ-
mental costs (in money terms) at home, D(S), and in a downstream
country, D*(S), where S are the safeguards (in money terms) applied
by the project operator. Suppose D'(S)<0, D"(S)>0, D*'(S)<0, D*"(S)>0.
A domestic bureaucracy maximising the domestic net project value
per period, W-D(S)-S, would grant permission to undertake the project
subject to the application of optimal safeguards S, where -D'(S)=1, if
W-D(S)-S>0. Suppose this is the case.Further suppose that optimal safeguards S have to be paid for by
the project operator himself so that his private net project value is given
by I1(S)=W-S. An interpretation of this is that domestic environmental
policy is undertaken by command and control instruments. As a starting
point from which we embark to analyse international environmental nego-
tiations we take it that the project operator has been allowed to under-
take the project subject to safeguards S. This project permit received
gives the operator a title to the environment which he can defend in
court.
As the project causes environmental costs, D*(S), abroad, S is not
necessarily optimal from the point of view of the downstream country. To
be precise, if the foreign country could select the level of safeguards to
be applied in the home country if it paid for it, it would set S=S*,
where -D*'(S*)=1. Obviously S* may be larger, equal or smaller than S.
The foreign country would never be enticed to engage in internatio-
nal negotiations pertaining to a modification of safeguards applied in the
domestic country unless S*>S. Let this be the case.






G > S* > S.
Given S*>S the foreign country is inclined to make some payments to the
home country in order that tighter safeguards be undertaken. And
obtaining sufficient payments from abroad the domestic government may
be willing to instruct its bureaucracy to bargain for tighter safeguards
in the domestic game.3. The Bargaining Model
Both international and domestic negotiations will be analysed in variations
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of the two party bargaining game depicted in Diagram 1.
At time t=0 party i makes a proposal to party j concerning the divi-
sion of a cake of any size. If j rejects i's offer it can terminate nego-
tiations and take an outside option which gives i a share e. and j a
share e. of the cake under negotiation. Rejecting i's offer, j may, how-
ever, continue bargaining by making a counter-offer in period t = l.
Party i then can accept j's offer, or terminate negotiations by taking the
outside option e. (implying e. for j) or it can continue bargaining in the
Put Diagram 1 about here
following period. The bargaining game continues until one country
accepts a proposal made or until a country takes its outside option. The
game is stationary.
Time costs of bargaining may occur because counter-offers can be
made only after one period has elapsed. Let this be represented by a
discount factor h. and h., 0<h.,h.<l, for parties i and j respectively.
Following the strategic approach to bargaining, a negotiated division
of the cake at stake must be an equilibrium point of the game in exten-
sive form, defined by the rules depicted in Diagram 1. Let m. be the
equilibrium share of the cake party i receives. It is shown in the Ap-
pendix that m. is given by
(3) m. = (l-h.)/(l-h..h.) if |.
e. < h -(1-h )/(l-h.-h )
2






m. = 1 - h.-(l-e.) if j , ,_ x
1 j i' [ e < h •(l-ei).
(5) m. = 1-e. otherwise.
The division of the cake, m, being a perfect equilibrium ensures
that a party's threat to leave the bargaining table and take the outside
option does only influence the outcome of negotiations if such a threat is
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not incredible. The outcome hence differs as to which party's outside
option poses a credible threat. This is represented by equations (3)-(5).
Equation (3) gives the equilibrium division of the cake if neither party
possesses a credible outside option. If only i has a credible outside
option available, then the equilibrium partition is given by equation (4).
And equation (5) represents the case where (only or in addition to
party i) party j possesses a credible outside option.
In the following sections this bargaining game will be applied to
international and domestic negotiations. As a starting point from which to
embark onto the analysis of consequences of non-exclusive domestic
property rights international negotiations in the presence of exclusive
titles to the environment are analysed first.
4. International Negotiations and Exclusive Domestic Property Rights
Let i be the upstream (home) country and let j be the downstream
(foreign) country. If the countries agree on safeguards S>S to be un-
dertaken in the upstream country the environmental gains obtained are
given by D*(S)-D*(S) abroad and D(S)-D(S) at home. Tighter safe-
guards, however, cause additional costs, S-S. Hence the size of the
A necessary condition of credibility of the threat of taking an
outside option is that taking it gives the party a payoff which is at
least as high as the payoff it receives if it would not take this
option.cake, C(S), which can be divided in negotiations in which safeguards S
are agreed upon is given by
(6) C(S) = D*(S) - D*(S) + D(S) - D(S) - (S-S).
If side-payments according to the "victim-pays" principle are per-
mitted countries agree to maximise the cake under negotiations (e.g.
Kuhl [1987]). Taking the derivative of equation (6) with respect to S it
follows that the countries agree to apply the globally optimal safeguards
S . Hence as the folk theorem suggests, negotiations lead to a globally
optimal allocation of the environment if international side-payments are
allowed.
Allowing for side-payments, bargaining over safeguards applied are
separated from bargaining over the distribution of benefits C(S ). To
determine the outcome of the latter, note that for as long as negotiations
continue S=S so that both countries remain deprived of any benefits
accruing from an agreement. Hence time costs of bargaining are positive
for both. Let this be represented by
(7)
.= h < 1
l
.= h* < 1.
Furthermore, it is straightforward that walking away from the bar-
gaining table without having reached an agreement would preserve the




e. = e* = 0.
J
Terminating negotiations without an agreement is good for nothing.
Heno
g iven by
Hence from (3)-(5), (7) and (8) the equilibrium partition m.=m is1-h*
where m is the share the upstream country receives from the cake of
size C(S
G).
Note that the total benefit M, MsnvC(S ), the upstream country
receives may be smaller, equal or larger than the domestic environmental
— t—'
gain D(S)-D(S ). This is because the upstream country's domestic
environmental gains are counted into the size of the cake under negotia-
tions and because safeguards S -S are paid out of gross benefits
D*(S)-D*(S
G)+D(S)-D(S
G) (see equation (6)).
5. The Problem With Non-Exclusive Property Rights
Given the project operator's right to apply in court the magnitude of
safeguards applied is in effect determined within the home country. As a
consequence the parties to an international agreement are restricted with
respect to the design of the contract. In particular, they are not free
anymore in setting safeguards.
This need not imply that the actual level of safeguards applied is
independent of the agreement reached in the international game. The
agreement could stipulate actions to be taken by the domestic government
which affect environmental quality indirectly by impinging on the process
in which the environment is allocated between the domestic parties
claiming titles to it. If the environment is in effect allocated as a result
of domestic negotiations an international agreement could therefore stipu-
late the position or behaviour of the domestic government or their agen-
cies in the domestic game.
Here, however, arises a difficulty if the foreign government cannot
sufficiently monitor the activities of the domestic government. In this
case, the domestic government could silently but effectively peter out of
the duties imposed by the agreement without at the same time sacrifying
all of the benefits.
Insufficient monitoring must be expected to pose a problem when
domestic property rights are not exclusively held by the parties to10
international environmental agreements because a country's performance
cannot simply be judged by environmental quality alone. In general, if
property rights are non-exclusive, a party's domestic claiming effort
would have to be monitored directly in order to evaluate its performance.
With respect to the particular problem we analyse, monitoring the domes-
tic bargaining process and the role of domestic government agencies
therein appears to be impossible.
There exists, however, an alternative. Countries could negotiate an
agreement which is incentive compatible. With an incentive compatible
contract the domestic government's self-interest ensures that it behaves
in accordance with the agreement.
In our model an incentive compatible international environmental
agreement is particularly simple. To see this, note that despite non-
exclusive property rights the two governments can agree on the division
of the benefits accruing from the application of safeguards S, S>S, what-
ever the size of S. Suppose therefore the two countries would agree on
a share m=m , the domestic country receives of a cake of size C(S),
whatever the size of the cake may be. Suppose, that after an agreement
on m is reached, the domestic government would be free to set safe-
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guards applied domestically. It then would maximise the domestic benefit
M(S)=m
1-C(S) by setting S2S. Inserting equation (6) into the definition
of M(S) and taking the derivative with respect to S we obtain the first
order optimality condition -D'(S)-D*'(S)=1 which is the same as condition
(1) which holds for a global social planner. Given an agreement on a
share m the domestic government would therefore apply the globally
optimal safeguards S in order to maximise the domestic benefit from the
agreement. Hence an international agreement in which only a share m is
fixed would be an incentive compatible contract if the domestic govern-
ment were free to set the environmental diligence applied.
It is therefore presumed that the domestic government possesses
exclusive property rights. However, contrary to the analysis of
Section 4, the magnitude of environmental diligence, S, applied is not
under negotiation.11
If property rights are non-exclusive and if safeguards are negotiated
in a domestic bargaining game, an international agreement on the share
m which the domestic country receives if it negotiates safeguards S,
S>S, with domestic project operators gives therefore the home country an
incentive to press for S=S in the domestic game. In this sense an
international contract on m alone is incentive compatible. When analysing
the domestic bargaining game, we will therefore presume that in the
international game an incentive compatible agreement has been reached.
Before turning to the domestic game a remark is in order. The
inability of governments to negotiate environmental safeguards in the
face of transboundary pollution is not necessarily a source of suboptimal
environmental policy. Optimal environmental safeguards may emanate from
international negotiations which merely set the "right" incentives for the
party which controls the environment. A suboptimal allocation of the
environment requires at least an additional restriction on the actions
which can be taken by parties to international negotiations such as those
which may emanate from the non-exclusivity of property rights.
6. The Domestic Bargaining Game
Suppose in the international game an agreement is reached by which the
domestic country receives a share m of whatever the global benefit C(S)
may be from safeguards S, S>S, determined in the domestic game. It is
known from Section 5 that for this agreement the domestic government's
most preferred safeguards are S=S .
In defining the domestic bargaining game, suppose that a domestic
private party having obtained a project permit conditional on the appli-
cation of safeguards S can appeal in the courts against governmental
command and control measures requiring safeguards in excess of S.
Suppose the probability that a project operator wins the court litigation
is given by the parameter k, 0<k<l. If the government or an environ-
mental bureaucracy in its stead wins in court then safeguards have to be12
applied as required by the government. If the project operator wins in
court then the project may be continued with safeguards S.
If k=0 property rights over the environment are held exclusively by
the domestic government and if k=l they are held only by the project
operator. If 0<k<l both the government and the project operator possess
competing claims over the environment. The parameter k may be inter-
preted as an indicator of the ex ante distribution of property rights.
Given the international agreement m the domestic government wants
that safeguards S >S be implemented. Suppose that it therefore advises
its environmental bureaucracy to pledge in a court litigation for safe-
, CG6 guards S .
If the environmental bureaucracy wins in court then the private
project value is given by W-S =n(S)-AS , where AS =S -S and where
II(S)sW-S. Solvency of the project operator in case of a lost court battle
— c*
requires II(S)-AS >0. Suppose this is the case.
If 0<k<l both the project operator and the environmental bureaucracy
representing the domestic government may lose in court. Both therefore
have an incentive to avoid court litigation and to negotiate an agreement
on additional safeguards AS out of court.
In this domestic bargaining situation the cake under negotiation is
given by the project operator's private project value I1(S) as additional
safeguards AS reduce the project value below I1(S).
It will be assumed that the rules governing the domestic game are
those depicted in Diagram 1. In particular, suppose the environmental
bureaucracy, party B in the domestic game, is represented by party j in
Diagram 1 and a project operator, party A in the
For simplicity, we neglect the possibility that the courts may decide
to implement safeguards which differ from either the safeguards
pleaded for by the project operator or those pleaded for by the
government or its agent.
Implicitly, it is assumed that government agencies are required to
represent the national public interest in court battles with private
domestic parties.Bibliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
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domestic game, is represented by party i in Diagram 1. Suppose both
project operators and the environmental bureaucracy are risk-neutral.
Contrary to the international game the parties to domestic negotia-
tions possess the outside option of appealing in the courts. In
particular a project operator's outside option is given by
(10) e. E e
1
 A
representing the fact that the private project value after a court deci-
sion is I1(S) with probability k or TI(S)-AS with probability 1-k.
In determining the outside option of the bureaucracy note that the
domestic country receives M(S )=m -CCS ) from the international agree-
ment if it wins in court. If it looses in court S=S. Hence, in this case it
follows from (6) that M(S)=0. The bureaucracy is therefore indifferent




Note that S.(k) may be interpreted as the reservation safeguards of
the bureaucracy. It would never agree on safeguards below S(k) as in
this case the domestic country would receive benefits from the inter-
national agreement below the expected benefit of triggering a court
decision. It follows straightforwardly from equation (11) that dS(k)/dk<0
whereby the bureaucracy's reservation safeguards are smaller the smaller
the chance of winning in court.
Let AS_(k)=S(k)-S. The value of the outside option of the bureau-
cracy, defined as the share in the private project value Il(S), may now
be expressed by
Note that the environmental bureaucracy can itself trigger a court
decision simply by "imposing" safeguards S by way of command and




As for as long as domestic negotiations continue the status quo of
safeguards S applied is preserved, the domestic country remains
deprived from any benefits accruing from the international agreement
until an agreement in reached in the domestic game. Hence the discount
factor of the bureaucracy h.shR is below 1.
Contrary to the bureaucracy a project operator remains in the best
of all possible states of the world for as long as negotiations are under-
way, as he may continue to operate the project under safeguards S.
Hence in domestic negotiations the project operator does not possess time
costs of bargaining with the bureaucracy. This may be represented by
Q
setting h.=h . =1.
Letting m.sm. be the equilibrium share a project operator receives,
I /\
then from the definitions (10), (12) h.shI3<l and h.sh.=l it follows for
the equilibrium partition (3)-(5)
l 0
r e > 1
(14) m = 1-h -(1-e ) if \
A B A [ e < n
 -(l-e )
For h.=l a project operator is indifferent between making a deal of a
given value today or tomorrow. In fact project operators prefer to
reach an agreement involving safeguards in excess of S rather later
than earlier. This would have to be represented by setting h.>l.
This "play on time" game would potentially further improve the
bargaining power of project operators. The partition of the cake
under domestic negotiations, derived from the "patience" game h =1
must therefore be interpreted as a limiting case, indicating the
maximum the bureaucracy can obtain in a "play on time" game
involving h >1.15
(15) m = l~
eTj otherwise.
Upon noting from equations (10) and (12) that e.<l and e-p.>0 it
follows from (13)-(15) that the equilibrium partition is given by (15).
This result is easily interpreted upon noting that equation (15) re-
presents the case where the environmental bureaucracy possesses a
credible outside option. Would the bureaucracy's outside option not be
credible, i. e. would the bureaucracy not be prepared to quit negotia-
tions, then the project operator could preserve the status quo of safe-
guards S forever. However, in that case and given e-p.>0 it would be
better for the bureaucracy to seek a court decision. Hence the bar-
gaining equilibrium must at least involve a share eR for the bureaucra-
cy. Apparently, in this situation the project operator would neither offer
the bureaucracy more nor accept a share for itself which is smaller than
l-eB.
Additional safeguards, AS, agreed upon in domestic negotiations must
satisfy m. •II(S)=n(S)-AS, from which one obtains upon substituting in
A
the equilibrium partition (15) and the RHS of equation (12)
(16) AS = AS.(k) .
Hence in the domestic game the project operator and the bureaucracy
agree on additional safeguards which are equal to the reservation incre-
ment of the environmental bureaucracy.
7. Repercussions on the International Environmental Agreement
If k>0, safeguards agreed upon in the domestic game S+AS are smaller
than the globally optimal safeguards S . This follows from equations
(11), (16), AS(k)=S(k)-S, M(S)=m
1-C(S) and dC(S)/dS>0. If property
rights rest in part with a domestic project operator then international
negotiations are unable to produce the globally optimal allocation of the
environment even if side-payments are permitted. The folk theorem
therefore does not hold anymore. In our model, the reason for this• 16
result is because the domestic government, although being enticed by
the international agreement to press for globally optimal safeguards,
simply does not possess enough punch in the domestic game.
For k-1 it follows from equation (11) that M(S(k))-O. It follows from
M(S)=m *C(S) and equation (6) that this requires S(k)-*S. As
AS(k)=S(k)-S it follows from (16) that AS=O if k-1. If property rights
rest (almost) exclusively with the project operator the domestic govern-
ment is unable to negotiate tighter safeguards. The performance depen-
dent benefit from the international agreement is therefore M(S)=O. The
upstream (domestic) country has lost the ability to negotiate any side-
payments to be paid by the downstream country.
For k-*0 it follows from (11) S.(k)=S . Being sure to win in court the
bureaucracy is not ready to agree on safeguards below S . The inter-
national bargaining game produces the results which are in accordance
with the folk theorem as a limiting' case.
As from (11) dS(k)/dk<0, dAS(k)/dk<0 so that from (16) the safe-
guards agreed upon are smaller the smaller the probability that the
bureaucracy wins in court. Hence the contingent benefit received by the
upstream country from side-payments decreases if the government's title
to the domestic environment diminishes.
The model implies that side-payments are in general not sufficient
for an optimal environmental quality to emanate from international envi-
ronmental agreements. If property rights are not exclusively held by the
parties to international environmental agreements then, in general,
environmental quality obtained is suboptimally low. Finally, the observa-
tion that transboundary environmental spillovers are not taken care of
optimally need to be due to the downstream government's constituency's
reluctance to accept the "victim-pays" principle.
8. Conclusions
The paper has analysed international environmental negotiations under a
set of complications which were to represent in an admittedly rather
abstract form a number of real world phenomena. These were:
(1) Domestic environmental policy being undertaken by command and
control instruments.17
(2) International side-payments obtained in accordance with inter-
national environmental agreements not being (necessarily) passed along
to the group of individuals having to pay for the costs of tighter safe-
guards.
(3) A legal system giving private parties the right to fight en-
vironmental command and control in the courts.
It has been tried in this paper to show that non-exclusive domestic
property rights emanating from these complications need not thwart
international environmental negotiations. The idea behind the emergence
of international cooperation in this paper was that in the face of these
complications international agreements must stipulate performance depen-
dent arrangements such as to entice contract compatible behaviour of
governments. In the model analysed such incentive compatible interna-
tional agreements were, however, unable to ensure optimal environmental
quality.
In this paper it was not tried to account of the interrelation between
non-exclusive domestic property rights and international environmental
negotiations comprehensively. Even within the special framework chosen
many questions remain unanswered. For example, international agree-
ments may affect the legal system such that the ex ante distribution of
environmental property rights are altered. Another gap still to be closed
pertains to the set of parties to international negotiations. Instead of
bargaining with the domestic government it might be advantageous for
the foreign government to bribe domestic project operators directly.
Appendix
If m. denotes the supremum of the share of the cake under negotiation
which party i can reap in a negotiated settlement in period 2, say, then,
by backward induction, the shares party i and party j can reap by an







































Solving the first row in Box 1 for m., we obtain the share country i
receives in a subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium. It is given by
equations (3)-(5) in the main body of the paper.19
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